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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
and Jacob E. Daly*
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
during the period of June 1, 2008 through May 31, 2009.1 It covers
noteworthy cases decided during the survey period by the Georgia
appellate courts, the United States Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and United States district
courts located in Georgia. In addition, this Article discusses bills
considered by the Georgia General Assembly during its 2009 session that
are particularly relevant to product liability cases.
I.

NEGLIGENCE

Under Georgia law, the elements for a negligence cause of action are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct
that arises as a matter of law to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm;
a breach of this standard of conduct;
a causal connection between the conduct and the
injury; and
2
damages that flow from the breach of the duty.

Counsel in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (BA.,
1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996).
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1. For analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 303 (2008).
2. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1982).
*
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"'The most common test of negligence is whether the consequences of the
alleged wrongful act are reasonably to be foreseen as injurious to others
coming within the range of such acts.'"3
The Georgia Court of Appeals examined the duty of a seller and
installer of tires in Underwood v. Select 7re, Inc.," a matter that arose
from the blowout of a right front truck tire. The plaintiff brought suit
against the driver of the truck, the company that sold the allegedly
defective tire, the company that installed the tire, and the tire manufacturer. The purchaser of the tires testified that he relied on the expertise
of the seller and installer to follow applicable regulations and to pick the
appropriate tires for the situation. At issue was whether the tire was
"regrooved," a condition in which a new tread is cut into the tread of a
worn tire.5
The trial court held that because the company that sold the tire was
not a tire dealer, it owed no duty to inspect the tire. In addition, the
trial court concluded that the installer of the tire did not owe any duty
to inspect the tire to determine whether it was appropriate for any
particular purpose.' In contrast, the court of appeals determined the
record showed that the tire seller was, in fact, in the business of selling
tires as part of its business of selling trailers that contained tires and
explained that "nothing in our law requires a company to sell only or
mostly one product before it incurs a duty toward its customers."7
Because part of the business of the tire seller was such that it acquired
an appreciation for the proper uses of certain tires in certain situations,
the seller here owed a duty to the purchaser to select the correct tires."

II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A.

Expert Testimony
On February 16, 2005, Governor Sonny Perdue signed into law new
rules for the admission of expert testimony in civil lawsuits,' essentially
adopting the Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.1 o standard

3. Sims v. Am. Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 468, 206 S.E.2d 121, 123 (1974) (quoting
Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 326-27, 124 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1962)).
4. 296 Ga. App. 805, 676 S.E.2d 262 (2009).
5. Id. at 805-06, 806 & n.2, 676 S.E.2d at 264-65, 265 & n.2.
6. Id. at 808, 676 S.E.2d at 266.
7. Id. at 809, 676 S.E.2d at 267.
8. Id.
9. 2005 Ga. Laws 1, 8-10 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2009)).
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.11 This new Daubert standard
was such a revolutionary development in the admissibility of expert
witness testimony that one trial judge has characterized it as a "sea
change of Georgia practice."12 Without many opinions from the Georgia
appellate courts interpreting the Daubert statute, practitioners and
judges assessing the admissibility of testimony from expert witnesses
must rely on decisions from the federal courts as persuasive authority. 3 The following cases from federal courts within the Eleventh
Circuit offer recent guidance on Daubert issues.
In Wilson v. TASER International,Inc.," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion of
the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Edward Meier, who treated the
plaintiff for pain arising from a spinal fracture that the plaintiff
allegedly sustained after being shot with a TASER electrical stun gun
as part of law enforcement training." Dr. Meier opined that the shock
from the TASER was the cause of the plaintiff's spinal fracture. He
based this opinion on the conclusions of another doctor and a case report
article. TASER moved to exclude this opinion because it was the
product of an unreliable methodology. The trial court agreed with
TASER and excluded Dr. Meier's opinion. Although the trial court found
Dr. Meier qualified to offer this opinion, the court concluded that the
methodology used by Dr. Meier was unreliable because he based his
opinion on only one case study."
On appeal, the plaintiff countered that because Dr. Meier was the
treating physician, his opinion should not be subject to the requirements
7 and Daubert."
8 The Eleventh Circuit
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael1
clarified that a treating physician may opine about the observations and
decisions made during the treatment of a patient, but when the
physician offers an opinion that is unrelated to the treatment of the

11. FED. R. EvID. 702; see O.C.GA. § 24-9-67.1.
12. Transcript of Record at 28, Moran v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 02A-6976 (State Ct.
Cobb County Mar. 21, 2005), affd, 276 Ga. App. 96, 622 S.E.2d 439 (2005).
13. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek guidance
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), GeneralElectric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and other federal court
interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
14. 303 F. App'x 708 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 709.
16. Id. at 710-11.
17. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
18. Wilson, 303 F. App'x at 712.
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patient, the reliability requirements of Daubert apply."9 Here, because
Dr. Meier did not need to determine the cause of the spinal fracture to
treat the plaintiff, his opinion regarding the cause of the injury was
subject to Daubert and Rule 702.20
Next, the Eleventh Circuit assessed the reliability of Dr. Meier's
methodology in developing his causation opinion according to the factors
set forth in Daubert and its progeny and determined that he failed to
meet any of the criteria.2' Dr. Meier had not tested his opinion, had
not shown his opinion was generally accepted or peer-reviewed, or shown
that he used a peer-reviewed source to reach his opinion.22 To the
extent that Dr. Meier relied on the opinions of others, there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the other doctors followed a reliable
methodology.'
Finally, Dr. Meier failed to rule out other possible
alternative mechanisms of injury, like osteoporosis. 2' Because Dr.
Meier did not follow a proper methodology, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed
2
the trial court's exclusion of his testimony.
The reliability of the testimony of a warnings expert was assessed in
Thomas v. Hubtex Maschinebau GmbH & Co. KG,2" in which the
plaintiff brought suit against Hubtex for injuries he sustained while
operating an allegedly defective sideloader that was used to transport
loads around a warehouse. While operating the sideloader, the plaintiff
adjusted one of the carrying arms, which caused it to shear off the head
of a stop bolt that retained the arm. The failure of the bolt
allowed the
27
arm to fall downward, crushing the plaintiff's right foot.
The plaintiff retained Dr. David Brani, a mechanical engineer, to
testify regarding the failure of the stop bolt. The manufacturer moved
to exclude Dr. Brani's testimony pursuant to Rule 702, arguing that the
testimony was not relevant to any of the issues at hand because Dr.
Brani's testimony related to a design defect claim, while the plaintiff was
pursuing a failure to warn claim.' The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia held that the existence of a design
defect is an element of a failure to warn claim.29 Thus, Dr. Brani's

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 712-13.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
No. 7:06-CV-81(HL), 2008 WL 4371977 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id.
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testimony about a defect in the sideloader was relevant to the failure to
warn claim.30 Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to
exclude Dr. Brani's opinion.31
Next, the manufacturer moved to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ruston
Hunt, who was offered as an expert witness regarding the warnings that
accompanied the sideloader, contending that his opinions were not
reliable. The manufacturer first challenged Dr. Hunt's opinion that the
sideloader contained a dangerous condition. This attack was based on
the fact that Dr. Hunt had not independently verified that a dangerous
condition existed but, instead, relied on Dr. Brani's opinions.32 The
court agreed and excluded this opinion, finding that Dr. Hunt had
merely "parroted" Dr. Brani's opinions.'
The manufacturer also moved to exclude Dr. Hunt's opinion that a
warning should have been attached to the sideloader to make users
aware of the potential hazard. The manufacturer contended that this
opinion was unreliable because, once again, the opinion was based on Dr.
Brani's conclusion that the sideloader contained a foreseeable danger.34
This time, the court disagreed with the manufacturer and held that Dr.
Hunt's opinion was reliable because his opinion was similar to an expert
witness basing an opinion on a hypothetical.' If the jury found that
Dr. Brani's conclusion of the presence of a significant hazard was wrong,
then there would be no need for the jury to consider Dr. Hunt's opinion
that a warning was needed.3"
Next, the manufacturer attacked Dr. Hunt's proposed warnings
because he had not tested the warnings. 37 But the court found that Dr.
Hunt's reliance on the American National Standards Institute Z535
Safety Standards and his credentials as a human-factors expert provided
sufficient reliability for the proposed warnings.8
Finally, the manufacturer objected to Dr. Hunt's opinion that the
manufacturer's failure to warn the plaintiff was the cause of the injuries
he sustained.89 The manufacturer argued that Dr. Hunt "has no basis
for concluding that Plaintiff would have read and heeded the warnings,

30. Id.
31. Id.
32.
33.

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.

34. Id.
35. Id.

36. Id.
37. Id. at *6.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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and therefore, his opinion is nothing more than unabashed speculation.4 Although the plaintiff countered that Dr. Hunt inspected the
facility and noted that safety was a priority and literature shows that
this type of proposed warning is generally effective, the court concluded
that Dr. Hunt did not provide a sufficient basis for this opinion.41 The
court emphasized that Dr. Hunt failed to come forward with any data
that would support the reliability of his methodology."
In Graff v. Baja Marine Corp.,' boat manufacturers moved to
exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's metallurgical expert witness,
Brian Rampolla, pursuant to Rule 702. The manufacturers contended
that Rampolla was not qualified to opine about failure of the gimbal
housing in a boat and that his opinions lacked sufficient reliability. The
trial court agreed with the manufacturers and granted the motion to
exclude Rampolla's testimony."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the trial court and
affirmed the exclusion of Rampolla's testimony.'
Rampolla had
concluded that the gimbal housing at issue was less ductile than a
properly manufactured unit and, thus, did not meet the manufacturer's
specification. Through visual and microscopic examinations, Rampolla
observed that the fracture surface contained a high concentration of beta
phase and a lack of ductile dimples. Rampolla opined that with proper
ductility there would have been more dimples in the fractured 46area and
that heightened concentrations of beta phase reduce ductility.
For the challenge to his qualifications, the Eleventh Circuit thought
it significant that Rampolla had to rely on an aluminum expert to
correctly assess the microscopic features of the fractured aluminum. 4
In addition, Rampolla did not seek this input from another engineer
until approximately one month before Rampolla finalized his opinions.48
The combination of reliance on the expertise of another witness in the
same technical area and the timing of the third-party input caused the
Eleventh Circuit to conclude that Rampolla was not qualified to opine in
this area.49

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
310 F. App'x 298 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 303-04.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2009]

PRODUCTLIABILITY

273

In affirming the conclusion that Rampolla's testimony was unreliable,
the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that Rampolla did not provide a basis
for his theories.6" He could not testify about an acceptable threshold
for beta phase before one would expect performance issues regarding the
ductility of the metal.51 In addition, Rampolla failed to undertake any
comparison of the metallic composition of the allegedly defective gimbal
housing with that of an exemplar.52 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the exclusion of Rampolla's testimony was appropriate because
63
there was no evidence that Rampolla employed a proper methodology.
B.

Spoliation
Spoliation is "the destruction or failure to preserve evidence that is
necessary to contemplated or pending litigation.' 4 Georgia courts
consider the following factors when determining whether spoliation of
evidence requires dismissal of the plaintiff's claims:
"(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the
destruction of the evidence;
whether the prejudice could be cured;
the practical importance of the evidence;
whether the plaintiff acted in good or bad faith; and
the potential for abuse if expert testimony about the
evidence was not excluded.

Sanctions for the spoliation of evidence can range from an adverse jury
instruction, exclusion of expert witnesses, and ultimately, dismissal of
the plaintiff's claims.56
In Boswell v. Overhead Door Corp.," the Georgia Court of Appeals
reinforced the readily apparent conclusion that spoliation sanctions are
permissible only against the spoliator.)8 The plaintiff was injured by
a falling overhead door at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport and
brought a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the door, among others.
Approximately five months after the incident, the City of Atlanta

50. Id. at 304.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Campbell, 258 Ga. App. 767, 768, 574
S.E.2d 923, 926 (2002).
55. Id. at 768-69, 574 S.E.2d at 926 (quoting Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 220
Ga. App. 539, 542, 469 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1996)).
56. Id. at 771, 574 S.E.2d at 927-28.
57. 292 Ga. App. 234, 664 S.E.2d 262 (2008).
58. Id. at 235, 664 S.E.2d at 263.
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disposed of the door, which prevented the plaintiff from identifying the
model of door at issue. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not come forward
with evidence of the door's design, whether the door was defective, or
whether the defendant was the manufacturer of the allegedly defective
door.5 9
In response to a summary judgment motion and in the face of the
absence of any evidence to prove his claim, the plaintiff contended that
a spoliation presumption was appropriate because the door was missing.
But there was no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the
manufacturer had any involvement in the loss of the door-specifically,
there was no evidence that the city disposed of the door while acting on
behalf of the manufacturer.'
Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and its proper
refusal of the presumption of any facts based on a claim of spoliation.61
In Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co.,62 the plaintiffs brought claims on
behalf of the occupants of a 1991 Ford Aerostar van who were injured
when the van rolled over and fell off a bridge into a river. The plaintiffs
alleged that the van was defective because its design made it more
susceptible to a rollover event when the van was fully loaded. At trial,
the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the manufacturer, Ford Motor
Company.63
In its cross-appeal, Ford contended that the trial court should have
sanctioned the plaintiffs because they did not preserve the van that was
at issue in the lawsuit.' To assess whether the trial court should have
imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs, the court of appeals reviewed the
five factors used to assess whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of
evidence.' Critically, the trial court found that the plaintiffs' loss of
the van resulted from negligence-not bad faith. 6 In addition, because
the van was lost shortly after the accident, neither side was able to view
the van, and thus, the sides were equally prejudiced. 7 The court of
appeals recognized that given the same evidence, other judges may have
ruled differently, but there was insufficient evidence to hold that the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 234-35, 664 S.E.2d at 262-63.
Id. at 235-36, 664 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 236, 664 S.E.2d at 263.
297 Ga. App. 835, 678 S.E.2d 489 (2009).
Id. at 835, 678 S.E.2d at 491-92.
Id. at 840, 678 S.E.2d at 495.
Id.; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Bagnell, 297 Ga. App. at 840, 678 S.E.2d at 495.
Id. at 840-41, 678 S.E.2d at 495.
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trial court abused its discretion in ruling that sanctions for spoliation of
evidence were inappropriate here."
The plaintiffs in Graff v. Baja Marine Corp. 9 filed a strict liability
action against a boat manufacturer for the alleged wrongful death of a
boat operator who was killed in a boating accident on Lake Lanier,
Georgia. The plaintiffs contended that the gimbal housing on the boat
was manufactured incorrectly and failed, causing the boat to spin out of
control. In contrast, the defendants contended that the housing broke
as a result of the impact between the boat and the water after the boat
became airborne.7 °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion of
tensile tests that were conducted by the plaintiffs' expert witness
because the plaintiffs removed the gimbal housing from the boat and
conducted destructive testing without notifying the manufacturer.7
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the defendants were significantly
prejudiced because the testing performed by the plaintiffs destroyed a
substantial part of the most important evidence in the case-the gimbal
housing.72 In addition, the testing performed by the plaintiffs was not
reliable because it was not performed in accordance with the standards
mandated by the American Society of Testing Materials.7 3 Because the
plaintiffs were the more culpable party, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the spoliation sanction was appropriate.74
III.

A.

DEFENSES

Preemption
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,75

federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land ...

any Thing in the

76
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."77
Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect."
A state law conflicts with a federal law "if it interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal," even if

Id. at 841, 678 S.E.2d at 495.
310 F. App'x 298 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
75. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
76. Id.
77. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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both the federal law and the state law have the same goal.7" Although
preemption issues are typically analyzed in connection with a federal
statute, a federal regulation may have the same preemptive effect as a
federal statute.7 9 State laws subject to preemption include not only
state statutes and regulations, but also tort duties imposed by state
common law and enforced by lawsuits.s"
"The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."s In
fact, Congress's purpose in enacting the federal law is the "ultimate
touchstone" of the preemption analysis. 2 Congress may manifest its
intent to preempt state law in three ways:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments
pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of
congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known
through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an
intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation ... so

pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it, or where an Act of Congress
touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject....
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually

conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption
where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'

78. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
79. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding that "a federal
agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may [also] preempt state regulation"); see also Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
154 (1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on Congress' intent to supersede state law [is)
misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be preempted by a federal agency's regulation).
80. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000); see also San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy.").
81. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.
82. Retail Clerks Intl Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
83. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (alteration in original) (first
omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although Congress's purpose is important, there is a presumption that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law, especially when it has
"'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied."'
Because "the regulation of health and safety matters is
primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern,"' state law
regulating these matters is preempted only if Congress's intent to do so
is "'clear and manifest."'
Thus, when faced with two or more
plausible interpretations of a federal law, this presumption imposes on
courts "a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption." 7
Congressional intent is determined primarily from the text of the
preemption provision, in the case of express preemption, or from the
overall structure and purpose of the statutory or regulatory scheme, in
the case of implied preemption, but the inquiry does not end there."
The principles of preemption described above must be considered in
conjunction with any applicable saving clause, which is the converse of
a preemption clause and operates to save or preserve state law (or
common law tort claims) to a specified degree, to determine the overall
preemptive effect of the federal law.'
As the Supreme Court has
observed, a "saving clause assumes that there are some significant
number of common-law liability cases to save." ° Indeed, the preemption argument "is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its
awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest [for
example, in a saving clause], and has nonetheless decided to 'stand by
both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them.' 9

84. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
85. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
86. Id. at 715 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and

manifest purpose of Congress.").
87. Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
88.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485-86.

89. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (examining in tandem the
preemption prevision and saving clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-11 (2006), to determine the preemptive scope of the Act); Geier, 529 U.S. at 868
("The language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes

common-law actions. Given the presence of the saving clause, we conclude that the preemption clause must be so read.").
90. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
91. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
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1. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Last year's
article discussed the opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals in
92
American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari,
which involved the
preemption clause in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
(Vaccine Act).' This clause provides as follows:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.'
In Ferrarithe plaintiffs' child sustained neurological damage after being
inoculated with vaccines containing thimerosal, which is a preservative
that contains mercury. The plaintiffs sued several vaccine manufacturers and others, alleging that their child's exposure to mercury caused his
neurological injuries and that the vaccines were defective because they
were manufactured with thimerosal. The vaccine manufacturers moved
for summary judgment on numerous grounds, including that the
plaintiffs' design defect claim was preempted by the Vaccine Act. The
trial court agreed and granted summary judgment on that issue.9 5
The court of appeals reversed and held that the Vaccine Act's
preemption clause does not preempt all state law claims based on an
alleged design defect. 96 The court of appeals explained that it was
faced with two plausible alternative interpretations of the preemption
clause:
One reading is that vaccine injuries are "unavoidable" and subject to
preemption if the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by
proper directions and warnings. The other reading is that design

92. 284 Ga. 384, 668 S.E.2d 236 (2008), affg 286 Ga. App. 305, 650 S.E.2d 585 (2007),
petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2009) (No. 08-1120).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006). For a summary of the Vaccine Act, the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program that it created, and the opinion of the court of
appeals, see Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, ProductLiability,Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 303, 328-32 (2008).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1). Vaccine manufacturers are also not liable for failure to
warn the injured person about the potential dangers of the vaccine. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa22(c).
95. Ferrari,284 Ga. at 384-85, 668 S.E.2d at 237.

96. Id. at 385, 668 S.E.2d at 237.
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defect claims are preempted only if the 7side effects are determined to
be unavoidable on a case-by-case basis.1
Because it considered these two interpretations to be plausible, the court
of appeals held that it was required by the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,9" to accept the
interpretation that disfavors preemption and to disregard the legislative
history of the Vaccine Act (which it interpreted as showing that
Congress intended to preempt design defect claims).'
The Georgia Supreme Court granted the vaccine manufacturers'
petition for writ of certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals, though not its reasoning.'00 The supreme court held that the
court of appeals erred in construing Bates as imposing an irrebuttable
presumption against preemption and precluding an examination of
congressional intent, but it nevertheless reached the same ultimate
decision as the court of appeals based on the text of the preemption
clause and Congress's intent in enacting it. 10 1 With respect to the text
of the clause, the supreme court relied on the conditional nature of the
phrase "if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were
unavoidable": °"
The conditional nature of this clause contemplates the occurrence of
side effects which are avoidable, and for which a vaccine manufacturer
may be civilly liable. In order to bar all liability for defective design
and to permit liability only for manufacturing and warning defects,
Congress could easily have omitted this clause, retained the last clause,
and made the bar to civil liability conditional on proper preparation
and warnings, so that subsection (b)(1) would simply state that a
vaccine manufacturer is not civilly liable "if the vaccine was properly
prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings. "1O3
But because Congress did not write the preemption clause like that, the
supreme court held that "it is best understood as barring liability only
for those side effects which were unavoidable by means other than

97. Id. (quoting Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 286 Ga. App. 305,311,650 S.E.2d
585, 590).
98. 544 U.S. 431 (2005). For a thorough discussion of Bates, see Franklin P. Brannen,
Jr. et al., ProductLiability,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 58 MERCER L. REV. 313,351-56
(2006).
99. Ferrari,284 Ga. at 385-86, 668 S.E.2d at 237.
100. Id. at 386, 668 S.E.2d at 237.

101. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 237-38.
102. 42 U.S.C § 300aa-22(b)(1).
103.

Ferrari,284 Ga. at 390, 668 S.E.2d at 240.
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proper manufacturing and packaging."'
Thus, "if such effects were
avoidable05 by a feasible alternative design, liability is not completely
"1
barred.
The supreme court found support for its construction of the text in the
contemporaneous and subsequent legislative history of the Vaccine
Act."°
The 1986 committee report refers to "unavoidably unsafe"
products as "'those products which in the present state of human skill
and knowledge cannot be made safe,'"'" which the supreme court
interpreted as "'leav[ing] open the possibility of a design defect claim'"
based on a vaccine that can be made safe."
In addition, the 1987
committee report, which was issued a year after the Vaccine Act was
enacted in connection with various amendments, provides that "'there
should be no misunderstanding that the Act undertook to decide as a
matter of law whether vaccines were unavoidably unsafe or not. This
question
, 109 is left to the courts to determine in accordance with applicable
law.
Finally, because Congress rejected an amendment to the Vaccine Act
that would have precluded liability based on a manufacturer's failure to
develop a safer vaccine, the supreme court presumed that Congress
intended to allow for such liability under certain circumstances. "0
Accordingly, the supreme court held that the preemption clause in the
Vaccine Act "does not preempt all design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers, but rather provides that such a manufacturer cannot be
held liable for defective design if it is determined, on a case-by-case
basis, that the particular vaccine was unavoidably unsafe."'
Adopting the vaccine manufacturers' interpretation of the preemption clause
"'would have the perverse effect of granting complete [tort] immunity
from design defect liability to an entire industry,'" and the supreme
court was not willing to adopt such a "far-reaching" interpretation of the

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 390-91, 668 S.E.2d at 240-41.
107. Id. at 390, 668 S.E.2d at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986),
reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367).
108. Id. (quoting Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 810 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006)).
109. Id. at 392, 668 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I), at 691 (1987),
reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-365).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 393, 668 S.E.2d at 242.
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preemption clause in the absence of "clear and manifest" evidence of

congressional intent."'
As noted in last year's article, the decision in Ferrari places the
Georgia Supreme Court at odds with every other court that has

considered this issue.113 Moreover, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc.," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the
supreme court's analysis in Ferrari and held that the Vaccine Act
preempts at least some, if not all, design defect claims." 5 The vaccine

manufacturers in Ferrarifiled a petition for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court on March 5, 2009,11 and the Court has
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the view of the
United States. 17 Before the Court ruled on the petition, and before
the Solicitor General fied her brief, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed

their claims without prejudice and filed a supplemental brief arguing
that the vaccine manufacturers' petition is moot."' Even if the Court
dismisses the Ferrari petition as moot, the preemption issue is not

necessarily settled because the plaintiffs in Bruesewitz have also filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the Court,1 9 which the vaccine
manufacturers agree should be granted. 2 The Court was scheduled
to consider the Bruesewitz petition at its November 6, 2009 conference,
121
but it has not yet issued a decision.

2. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

In 1906 Congress took

its first meaningful step into the arena of drug regulation when it

enacted the Federal Food and Drugs Act

22

to prohibit the manufac-

112. Id. at 394,668 S.E.2d at 243 (alteration in original) (quoting Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 267 Ga. 574, 576-77, 481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1997)).
113. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2007), affd, 561
F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Aug. 4, 2009) (No.
09-152); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301-03 (E.D. Pa. 2007);
Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664-66 (S.D. Tex. 2004);
Militrano,810 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
114. 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009).
115. Id at 251.
116. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 284 Ga. 384,668 S.E.2d 236 (2008), petitionfor
cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2009) (No. 08-1120).
117. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (2009) (mem.).
118. Alyson M. Palmer, Vaccine Cases Draw Interest, Unusual Move, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Dec. 2, 2009, at 1.
119. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78
U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Aug. 4, 2009) (No. 09-152).
120. Palmer, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
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ture, shipment, and sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs. 123 This
Act did not "cover the entire ground" of drug regulation because its scope
was quite limited, so the states retained a significant role in protecting
consumers. 2' Because this Act left a number of regulatory gaps,
125
Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 12
in 1938 to strengthen and expand the protection of consumers. 1
During the decades that followed, Congress amended the FDCA many
times to expand the scope of regulation,127 but none of these amendments ever sought to preclude the states from playing a role in the
regulation of prescription drugs or protection of consumers from
adulterated or misbranded drugs. In 1962, for example, Congress
enacted a saving clause that contemplates some state activity in this
field:
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any
provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such
amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such
amendments and such provision of State law."u
Moreover, Congress has enacted express preemption provisions for
129 and tobacco products,"0 but it has never enacted
medical
devices
an express
preemption
provision for prescription drugs."' As a result

123. Id.
124. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 532 (1912).
125. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. ch. 9
(2006)).
126. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282 (1943).
127. The regulatory scheme established by the FDCA is quite extensive, so a full
description of it is beyond the scope of this article. However, several courts have provided
a good summary. See, e.g., Home v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 768, 777-78
(W.D.N.C. 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-83 (E.D. La.
2007).
128. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793.
129. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 574
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).
130. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), Pub. L. No. 11131, Div. A, Title I, § 101(bX3), 123 Stat. 1776, 1823 (2009) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 3 8 7 p(a)( 2 )).
131. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d at 785 ("Congress has never spoken
on preemption with respect to prescription drugs; thus, state-law failure-to-warn claims
against drug manufacturers are not expressly preempted."); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Congress has not spoken on the issue of
preemption as related to prescription drugs, and this silence is telling."); Witczak v. Pfizer,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn. 2005) ("Congress has not expressed a specific
intent to preempt state consumer-protection laws in the area of prescription-drug
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of the absence of an express preemption provision and because the
Supreme Court has cautioned against finding implied preemption, most
courts have held that the FDCA
does not preempt state law claims based
12
on an alleged failure to warn.

1

Although Congress has decided to forego express preemption with
respect to prescription drugs, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has spoken on this issue as the agency responsible for drug labeling. In
the preamble to its January 24, 2006 final rule entitled "Requirements
on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products," the FDA found that "product liability lawsuits have
directly threatened the agency's ability to regulate manufacturer
dissemination of risk information for prescription drugs in accordance
with the [FDCA]."13 Because the FDCA "establish[es] both a 'floor'
and a 'ceiling'" with respect to labeling requirements, the FDA concluded
that "State laws conflict with and stand as an obstacle to achievement
of the full objectives and purposes of Federal law when they purport to
compel a firm to include in labeling or advertising a statement that FDA
has considered and found scientifically unsubstantiated."134 Since
January 24, 2006, courts across the country have divided on how much
deference to give to the FDA's opinion in determining whether state law
claims based on inadequate labeling are preempted. 35
In a highly anticipated case decided during the survey period, the
United States Supreme Court confronted this issue, as well as the
general issue of whether the FDA's approval of the labeling for a
prescription drug impliedly preempts a state law claim for failure to
warn. In Wyeth v. Levine,13 the plaintiff was injured after receiving
an injection of Phenergan, which is an antihistamine used to treat
nausea. Phenergan can be injected intramuscularly or intravenously,
and an intravenous injection can be administered through the IV-push
method (a direct injection into the patient's vein) or the IV-drip method
(introduction to the bloodstream via a catheter in the patient's vein).

labeling."); Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876, 885 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ("Congress
and the FDA has [sic] chosen not to include an express preemption clause in the statutes
and regulations for prescription drugs.").

132. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1018-19, 1019 n.16 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); In re Vicxx Prods.Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d
at 785-86 (collecting cases); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 274

(collecting cases).
133.

71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006).

134. Id. at 3935.
135. See, e.g., Home, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 780-81 (collecting cases); In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (collecting cases).
136. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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The drug causes irreversible gangrene if it enters the patient's artery.
Wyeth introduced injectable Phenergan in 1955 after the FDA approved
its new drug application. Wyeth submitted two supplemental new drug
applications in the 1970s, which the FDA approved subject to certain
changes to the label. Wyeth submitted a third supplemental new drug
application in 1981 in response to a new regulation, and in 1987 the
FDA suggested different warnings concerning the risk of arterial
exposure. In 1988 Wyeth submitted proposed changes to incorporate the
FDA's suggestions, but the FDA never responded to Wyeth's proposal.
In 1996 the FDA instructed Wyeth to retain the language in the thencurrent label concerning intra-arterial injection. In 1998 the FDA
approved Wyeth's 1981 supplemental new drug application and
instructed it not to change the label.

7

On April 7, 2000, the plaintiff went to a clinic because she was
experiencing a migraine headache and nausea. She received an
intramuscular injection of Demerol for the headache and Phenergan for
the nausea. She returned to the clinic later the same day for a second
injection of both drugs because she was still experiencing the headache
and nausea. This time, the injections were administered intravenously
through the IV-push method. Somehow, Phenergan entered her artery,
and she developed gangrene and had to have her right hand and forearm
amputated. The plaintiff sued Wyeth, alleging that the label was
defective because it did not sufficiently warn clinicians about the risks
of using the IV-push method. Wyeth moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were preempted by
the FDCA, and the trial court denied the motion. Following a five-day
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial court denied
Wyeth's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, again
rejecting Wyeth's preemption arguments, and the Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed.1"
The Supreme Court granted Wyeth's petition for writ of certiorari
because of "[t]he importance of the pre-emption issue, coupled with the
fact that the FDA has changed its position on state tort law." 139 The
issue presented was "whether the FDA's drug labeling judgments
preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that
different labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably
safe for use." 4 Wyeth first argued that the plaintiff's claims were
preempted because it would be impossible to comply with the state law

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1191-92.
at 1191-93.
at 1193.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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duties underlying her claims-that is, provide a stronger warning on the
label about the risks of using the IV-push method-without violating
federal law relating to labeling. Specifically, Wyeth argued that it was
not permitted to change the label without first obtaining the FDA's
approval.'
The Court disagreed and held that the FDA's regulations
permitted Wyeth to revise the label to strengthen it without prior
approval. 4 2 The Court explained that "a central premise of federal
drug regulation [is] that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the
content of its label at all times. It is charged both with crafting an
adequate label and with ensuring that its warnings remain adequate as
long as the drug is on the market."" Thus, the Court held that "when
the risk of gangrene from IV-push injection of Phenergan became
apparent, Wyeth had a duty to provide a warning that adequately
described that risk, and the ['changes being effected'] regulation
permitted it to provide such a warning before receiving the FDA's
approval."'4 4 Noting that "[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding
defense," the Court held that the plaintiff's claims were not preempted
because Wyeth had not shown that it was impossible for it to comply
with its duty under Vermont law and the FDA's regulations.'4 5
Wyeth's second argument was that the plaintiff's claims were
preempted because "requiring it to comply with a state-law duty to
provide a stronger warning about IV-push administration would obstruct
46
the purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling regulation."'
Echoing the language of the FDA's 2006 preamble, Wyeth specifically
argued "that the FDCA establishes both a floor and a ceiling for drug
regulation," meaning that state law cannot consider a label to be
inadequate once the FDA has approved it.'4 7 The Court, however, was
not convinced."
The history of federal drug regulation, including
Congress's decision not to enact an express preemption provision and its
awareness of state tort litigation brought by consumers who were injured
by unsafe or ineffective drugs, shows "that Congress did not intend FDA
oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness."" 9

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1196.
at 1196-97.
at 1197-98.
at 1198.
at 1199.
at 1199-1200.
at 1200.
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Relying on the FDA's 2006 preamble, Wyeth argued that because the
FDA's approval of a label means that the FDA has balanced the risks
and benefits of the drug and has determined that the label is adequate
and appropriate, a tort claim based on a different conclusion by state law
would be inconsistent with the FDA's judgment. 50 While recognizing
that an agency's views concerning the effects of state law on the
objectives of a federal regulatory scheme may be given some weight, the
Court decided that the FDA's 2006 preamble was entitled to no
First, the preamble represents the FDA's conclusion
deference.1"'
about the preemption issue, but the Court defers only to an agency's
explanation of how state law impacts federal law, not to the ultimate
preemption decision.' 52 Second, the weight to be given to an agency's
views depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness, and
the Court found the preamble to be lacking on these factors because (1)
it was inconsistent with its own notice of proposed rulemaking, which
disclaimed any intent to preempt state law, (2) it was issued without an
opportunity for interested parties to comment, (3) it changes the FDA's
longstanding position on preemption without explaining the change or
why it was necessary, and (4) historically, the FDA considered state law
to be "a complementary form of drug regulation" because of its limited
resources.15 3 In fact, state tort claims "offer[] an additional, and
important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA
regulation" because they provide an incentive for injured consumers to
come forward with information and for drug manufacturers to monitor
safety information and disclose risks."M Accordingly, the Court held
that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim was not preempted because it
did not frustrate the purposes of the FDCA."'
3. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. In the
wake of the Surgeon General's landmark 1964 report that declared
cigarette smoking to be a health hazard," 6 Congress enacted the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) 157 in 1965 "to

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1201-02.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1204.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH REPORT

OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

31 (1964).
157. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1331-41 (2006)).
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establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health." "' The specific objectives of the FCLAA are to
(1) inform the public about the hazards of cigarette smoking by including
warnings on cigarette packaging and advertisements, and (2) protect
commerce and the national economy by preventing "diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations" relating to
the hazards of cigarette smoking. 9 To accomplish the first objective,
the FCLAA mandates specific warning labels on every package of
cigarettes sold or distributed in the United States.l" To accomplish
the second objective, the FCLAA includes a preemption provision, which
in its current form provides as follows:
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on
any cigarette package.
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter."'

158. 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 1333(a). Originally, the required warning was "Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May Be Hazardous to Your Health." FCLAA § 4, 79 Stat. at 283. In 1970 Congress
changed the required warning to "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That
Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970). In 1984 Congress required
packages and advertisements to include one of four rotating warnings. Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200,2201-02 (1984). On June
22, 2009, Congress passed a law that will require packages and advertisements to include
one of nine rotating warnings, each of which is stronger and more direct than previous
warnings. FSPTCA § 201(a), 123 Stat. at 1842-45 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333). This new
law is effective fifteen months after the Secretary of Health and Human Services issues
mandatory regulations. Id. § 201(b), 123 Stat. at 1845.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b). In addition, the FSPTCA amended the FDCA to add a
new preemption provision relating to tobacco products. FSPTCA § 101(b)(3), 123 Stat. at
1823. Under that provision, "any requirement which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement under the provisions of this chapter relating to tobacco product
standards, premarket review, adulteration, misbranding, labeling, registration, good
manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco products" is preempted. Id. (to be
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A)). The FSPTCA also added the following provision: "No
provision of this chapter relating to a tobacco product shall be construed to modify or
otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under the product liability law of
any State." Id, 123 Stat. at 1824 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387p(b)). The interplay
between these two provisions is sure to generate substantial litigation.
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In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,162 a majority of the Supreme
Court held that the first clause "merely prohibit[s] state and federal
rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements on
cigarette labels."'" It does not preempt state law damages claims. 1"
With respect to the second clause, a plurality of the Court reasoned that
"pre-emption of 'state law' cannot fairly be limited to positive enactments."'" However, the plurality was quick to say that this "does not
mean that [15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)] pre-empts all common-law claims."'"
Instead, the "central inquiry" is "whether the legal duty that is the
predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and health... imposed under State law
with respect to... advertising or promotion.'1 6 7 Under that standard,
the plurality held that the second clause preempts "claims based on a
failure to warn and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings
to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in ...
advertising or promotions."1" It does not preempt other claims, such
as breach of express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation,
or conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts.'6 9 In Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 7 ° the only other case before the survey period
in which the Court considered the preemption provision in the FCLAA,
the Court applied these principles to hold that regulations promulgated
by the Massachusetts Attorney General relating to the sale and
advertising of cigarettes were preempted because they were motivated
71
by concerns about smoking and health.

162.

505 U.S. 504 (1992).

163. Id. at 518. The recently enacted FSPTCA provides an exception to the scope of
the first clause in the preemption provision. FSPTCA § 202(a), 123 Stat. at 1845
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a)). This exception allows the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to require "additional or different statements on any cigarette package" under the

FSPTCA. Id
164. 505 U.S. at 519-20.
165. Id. at 523.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 523-24 (omissions in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
168. Id. at 530-31.
169. Id. at 531.
170. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
171. Id. at 546-51. In reaching this decision, the Court rejected the Massachusetts
Attorney General's argument that the regulations should not have been preempted because
they related to the location, rather than the content, of advertising. Id. at 548-49. The
Court explained, "But the content/location distinction cannot be squared with the language
of the pre-emption provision, which reaches all 'requirements' and 'prohibitions' 'imposed

under State law.'" Id. at 548 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). Since the Court decided Reilly,
however, Congress amended the preemption provision to permit states and local govern-
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During the survey period, the Supreme Court considered the FCLAAs
preemption provision for only the third time. In Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good,"' a group of Maine residents who smoked Marlboro Lights and
Cambridge Lights sued Phillip Morris USA, Inc., the manufacturer of
those cigarettes, for fraudulently advertising "light" cigarettes as having
less tar and nicotine than regular cigarettes. Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that Phillip Morris deliberately deceived them about the dangers
of light cigarettes because it knew that light cigarettes do not have less
tar and nicotine and are not less harmful than regular cigarettes. The
basis for the plaintiffs' claim was that although Phillip Morris accurately
advertised the tar and nicotine yields of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge
Lights according to testing on a machine by the Cambridge Filter
Method, it knew that smokers compensate for the lower tar and nicotine
in light cigarettes by covering filter ventilation holes, taking longer and
more frequent puffs, and holding the smoke inside their lungs longer
before exhaling. This compensatory behavior, the plaintiffs alleged,
negates the lower tar and nicotine yields obtained by the machine and
actually results in smokers inhaling as much tar and nicotine as
smokers of regular cigarettes. In fact, the plaintiffs alleged that light
cigarettes are more harmful than regular cigarettes because their smoke
is more mutagenic per milligram of tar due to the way they are
ventilated. Phillip Morris moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs' claim was preempted by the FCLAA, and the United
States District Court for the District of Maine agreed. The district court
held that the plaintiffs' claim was preempted under Cipollone because
the claim was based on an alleged failure to warn or neutralization of
the warning label. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
was the type of fraud
Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiffs' claim
173
claim that is not preempted under Cipollone.
The Supreme Court granted Phillip Morris's petition for writ of
certiorari to resolve a split between the First Circuit's decision in this
case and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in a similar case. 174 Although Phillip Morris acknowledged

ments to "enact statutes and promulgate regulations, based on smoking and health ....
imposing specific bans or restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not content, of
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes." FSPTCA § 203, 123 Stat. at 1846 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(c)).
172. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).

173. Id. at 541-42.
174. Id. at 542. In Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
2007), the Fifth Circuit held that similar claims involving the marketing of light cigarettes
were preempted because "the use of FTC-approved descriptors [such as 'light' and 'lowered

tar and nicotine] cannot constitute fraud." Id. at 392. The Fifth Circuit explained,
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that the FCLAA does not preempt state law claims based on allegedly
inaccurate statements about the relationship between smoking and
health, it argued that Congress did not intend for state law to govern
such statements because enforcement via state law would thwart the
FCLAA's purpose of preventing diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations.175 Thus, Phillip Morris
argued that the plaintiffs' claim was expressly preempted by the FCLAA
because it was analogous to the warning neutralization claim that the
plurality in Cipollone found to be preempted. 7 ' The Court rejected
Phillip Morris's characterization of the plaintiffs' claim and instead
177
found that the claim was based on a state law duty not to deceive.
In contrast, the state law duty involved in Cipollone (with respect to the
warning neutralization claim) was based on a prohibition of statements
17
relating directly to the relationship between smoking and health. 1
Because a state law duty not to deceive "has nothing to do with smoking
and health," the Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was not expressly
preempted by the FCLAA.'79
Phillip Morris also argued that the FCLAA impliedly preempted the
plaintiffs' claim because it conflicted with the longstanding policy of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promote low-tar cigarettes and
encourage consumer reliance on the tar and nicotine levels generated by
the Cambridge Filter Method. 8 ° According to Phillip Morris, "the FTC
has required tobacco companies to disclose tar and nicotine yields in
cigarette advertising using a government-mandated testing methodology
and has authorized them to use descriptors as shorthand references to
those numerical test results."' After reviewing the regulatory history
on this topic, however, the Court concluded that "the FTC has in fact
never required that cigarette manufacturers disclose tar and nicotine

Cigarettes labeled as "light" and "low-tar" do deliver less tar and nicotine as
measured by the only government-sanctioned methodology for their measurement.
In fact, the Manufacturers are essentially forbidden from making any representations as to the tar and nicotine levels in their marketing about tar that are not
based on the FTC method. The terms "light" and "lowered tar and nicotine"
cannot, therefore, be inherently deceptive or untrue.
Id. (footnote omitted).
175. Good, 129 S. Ct. at 544-45.
176. Id. at 546.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 545, 549.
180. Id. at 549.
181. Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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yields, nor has it condoned representations of those yields through the
use of 'light' or 'low tar' descriptors."'8 2 The Court explained,
This history shows that, contrary to [Phillip Morris's] suggestion, the
FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations
based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has
endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine
content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances
prevented misleading-representations of Cambridge Filter Method test
results. The FTC's failure to require [Phillip Morris] to correct [its]
allegedly misleading use of "light" descriptors is not evidence to the
contrary; agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not the same
as a policy of approval.l"
Moreover, the Court noted that the FTC has recently questioned the
continued viability of the Cambridge Filter Method and sought
comments on whether the terms "light" and "low tar" are accurate and
contain implied representations as to the health effects of smoking."
Thus, the Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was not impliedly
preempted by the FCLAA because there is no conflict between enforcement of the state law duty not to deceive and the FTC's policies
85
regarding smoking and health."
B.

Statute of Repose

Because many product liability claims do not accrue until years after
exposure to or use of the allegedly defective product, the statute of
repose is an important defense for manufacturers. Unlike a statute of
limitations, which does not begin to run until the cause of action
accrues,'18 a "statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in
which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs outside that period, it is
not actionable." 8 1 In other words, "a statute of limitations operates
only on an existing cause of action, while a statute of repose may operate

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 551.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007) (providing that claims for personal injuries must
be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues).

187. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357, 367 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988); see also
Gwinnett Place Assocs., L.P. v. Pharr Eng'g, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 53, 54 n.2, 449 S.E.2d 889,
890 n.2 (1994) ("A statute of ultimate repose limits absolutely the time during which a
party may bring an action, regardless of when the cause of action accrues. It is
distinguished from a statute of limitation, which is a procedural rule delineating a time
period measured from the accrual of the right of action during which a party must bring
an action.").
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to extinguish or abolish a potential cause of action prior to its existence. " '88 Thus, a statute of repose stands as a substantial obstacle for
plaintiffs because it can bar an action even before an injury occurs and
before the statute of limitations begins to run.189 Similarly, a statute
of repose can effectively shorten the period of limitations if the cause of
action accrues with less time remaining in the period of repose than in
the period of limitations."
For example, a cause of action that
accrues one month before the period of repose expires will be barred if
a lawsuit is not ified within that month, even if there is a two-year
limitations period applicable to the cause of action. 9 '
Georgia's statute of repose for product liability claims" 9 is no
different; it "stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiffs right of
action." 93
This amounts to a recognition that the legislature may conclude that
the time may arrive when past transgressions are no longer actionable.
The long history of such conclusions emphasizes their rationality.
From the biblical time of the Year of Jubilee to the present day,
policymakers have exercised the right to "wipe the slate clean" after a
fixed period of time. In doing this, there is the clear distinction
between a statute of limitation "barring" an action, and a statute of
repose providing for the abolition of a cause of action after the passage
of the time provided."9
The statute bars strict liability claims brought more than ten years after
"the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property
causing or otherwise bringing about the injury." 95 The statute
similarly bars negligence claims, except those based on injuries or
damages arising out of (1) negligence in manufacturing a product that

OF ToRTs § 25-9 (2008-2009 ed.).
189. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 101, 344 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1986),

188. CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW

superseded on othergrounds by 1987 Ga. Laws 613, 613 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.

§ 51-1-11(c) (2000 & Supp. 2009)); Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648,651,446 S.E.2d
741, 744 (1994) (en banc) ("Moreover, the eight-year repose limit applies regardless of when
the injury occurs or, indeed, whether a cause of action has accrued at all prior to the

expiration of the period.").
190. Hatcher,256 Ga. at 101, 344 S.E.2d at 420.

191. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("If someone is injured by the use of personal property
on the last day, or very near the end, of the ten year period commencing with the date of
first sale, there is a great likelihood the injured person would have no opportunity to file
suit within the ten year period.").
192. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (2000 & Supp. 2009).
193. Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845, 426 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1993).

194. Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660, 437 S.E.2d 308, 310
(1993).
195. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(bX2).
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causes disease or birth defects; (2) conduct that "manifests a willful,
reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property"; and (3) a negligent
The Georgia General Assembly's purpose in
failure to warn. 1
enacting the statute was to eliminate stale claims and remedy problems
in the insurance industry generated by open-ended liability of manufacturers.'97
The statute of repose was involved in three cases decided during the
survey period. The first, Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co.,"' considered a
question of first impression in Georgia-whether the statute of repose is
substantive or procedural. 199 This is an important issue in cases
involving injuries that occurred outside Georgia because the law of the
state where the injuries occurred may supply a different repose period
than Georgia. 2" The injuries involved in Bagnell occurred as a result
of a single-vehicle accident in Texas, but the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit
in Georgia. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs' design-defect claims were barred by Georgia's tenyear statute of repose because they filed the complaint twelve years after
the first sale of the vehicle. The trial court agreed with the defendant
that the plaintiffs filed the complaint outside Georgia's ten-year repose
period, but it held that factual disputes as to the applicability of the
"willful, reckless, or wanton disregard" exception precluded summary
judgment. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the trial court
erred in applying Georgia's ten-year statute of repose rather than
Texas's fifteen-year statute of repose (under which the plaintiffs' claims
would not have been barred). °1
Under Georgia's choice-of-law rules, substantive issues are governed
by the law of the state where the tort occurred, whereas procedural and
remedial questions are governed by the law of the state where the case
is filed.2 °2 Thus, the question facing the court of appeals was whether
Georgia's statute of repose is substantive or procedural/remedial. 0 3

196. Id. § 51-1-11(c).
197. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 725, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1994); Love v.
Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 703, 449 S.E.2d 602, 605 (1994); see also Hill, 186 Ga. App.
at 357, 367 S.E.2d at 131 ("These limitations on liability for injuries occurring after a
certain period are based upon reasonable expectations about the useful life of a building
or a manufactured product.").
198. 297 Ga. App. 835, 678 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 836, 678 S.E.2d at 492.
Id.
Id. at 835-36, 678 S.E.2d at 491-92.
Id. at 836, 678 S.E.2d at 492.
Id.
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The court of appeals found no binding authority on this question in the
choice-of-law context, so it turned for assistance to cases that analyze
whether a statute is substantive or procedural/remedial for purposes of
determining whether it can apply retroactively.2 4 Those cases hold
that "'statutes of repose look only to remedy and not to substantive
rights, and thus under certain conditions can be applied retroactively.'" 20 5 Finding no reason why this rule should not apply equally in

the choice-of-law context, the court of appeals held that Georgia's statute
of repose is procedural/remedial in nature and upheld the trial court's
decision to apply it-rather than Texas's statute of repose-to the
plaintiffs' claims.2"
The second case involved the oft-litigated issue of when the statute of
repose begins to run. The statute provides that it begins to run upon the
"first sale for use or consumption" of the product, but it does not define
that phrase.20 7 In Campbell v. Altec Industries, Inc.,20" the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had to decide
when the statute of repose began to run with respect to a lower boom lift
cylinder on a bucket truck that malfunctioned while the plaintiff was
working in it. 2

9

Georgia Power Company ordered the bucket truck

from Altec Industries in March 1997. In early October 1997, Altec
Industries purchased a lower boom lift cylinder from Texas Hydraulics,
and the lower boom lift cylinder arrived at the Altec Industries facility
in Missouri by October 10, 1997. Altec Industries installed the lower
boom lift cylinder on the lift portion of the bucket truck by January 2,
1998, and on January 14, 1998, it installed the lift portion of the bucket
truck (with the lower boom lift cylinder attached) on a test chassis.
After testing the lower boom lift cylinder several times with the test
chassis, Altec Industries transported the lift portion of the bucket truck
to its facility in Alabama. The lift portion of the bucket truck was
installed on the permanent chassis of the bucket truck in March 1998,
and the completed bucket truck was delivered to Georgia Power
Company in April 1998. The plaintiff filed his complaint on February
4, 2008, alleging that the lower boom lift cylinder was defective, and the
defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the

204. Id. at 836-37, 678 S.E.2d at 492-93.
205. Id. at 837, 678 S.E.2d at 493 (quoting Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 277 Ga. App. 464,
470, 627 S.E.2d 90, 96 (2006)).
206. Id.
207. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2).
208. No. 1:08-CV-0810-JOF, 2009 WL 426472 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2009).
209. Id. at *1-2.
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plaintiff's claims for design and manufacturing defects were barred by
the statute of repose. 1 °
The question for the district court was which date between March
1997 and April 1998 constituted the "first sale for use or consumption"
of the lower boom lift cylinder such that the ten-year repose period
began running. 21 After reviewing the cases interpreting the meaning
of the phrase "first sale for use or consumption,"212 the district court
concluded,
[Tihe statute of repose in O.C.G.A § 51-1-11 begins to run once an
allegedly faulty product is (1) sold or placed in the stream of commerce,
(2) to an individual or entity that plans to use or consume it for its
intended purpose in the near future, and (3) is not a mere dealer who
plans to retain it in inventory to be used at a later time. 13
Based on this rule, the district court held that the ten-year repose period
began running on January 14, 1998, when Altec Industries installed the
lift portion of the bucket truck (with the lower boom lift cylinder
attached) on a test chassis.21 4 At that time, the lower boom lift
cylinder had been placed into the stream of commerce and was able to
be used for its intended purpose, and Altec Industries did not intend to
hold it in inventory for a later sale.215 The plaintiff argued that the
repose period did not begin to run until the entire bucket truck was
completed in March 1998, but the district court rejected that argument
because the lower boom lift cylinder was operable before the entire
bucket truck was completed. 2 6 As the district court explained, "a
lower boom lift cylinder can operate as it is intended in a lift even
though that lift is attached to a stationary test chassis rather than a
mobile truck chassis. The truck chassis merely serves to make the lift
portable; it does not impact the ability to 'lift.'" 21 7 In that regard, it

was important that the plaintiff alleged that the lower boom lift cylinder
was defective rather than the bucket truck itself.218 "Thus, the

210. Id. at *1.
211. Id. at *2.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *3 (citing Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997);
Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Ga.
App. 166, 637 S.E.2d 202 (2006)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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relevant inquiry is not when the bucket truck ultimately entered the
stream of commerce or whether it was operating as it was intended but
rather the movement and function of the lift." 219 Accordingly, the
district court held that the ten-year repose period began to run on
January 14, 1998, and expired on January 14, 2008, which meant that
the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff filed his complaint twenty-one days too late.'
The third case involved the exception for "conduct which manifests a
willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.""' In Parks
v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc.,22 the plaintiffs' five-year-old child
sustained fatal injuries when the vehicle in which he was riding collided
head-on with another vehicle.22 Because the first retail owner of the
vehicle purchased it on January 14, 1989, it was undisputed that the
ten-year repose period had expired at the time the plaintiffs filed their
complaint on December 30, 1999. However, the plaintiffs contended that
the "willful, reckless, or wanton disregard exception" applied such that
their design-defect claim was not barred. Specifically, the plaintiffs
argued that Hyundai's design of the lap-only seat belt showed a willful,
reckless, or wanton disregard for life because it was aware of prior
similar accidents based on similar alleged defects but did not change the
design.22
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to make the required
foundational showing of substantial similarity, as required by Cooper
71re & Rubber Co. v. Crosby,22 which meant that there was no
evidence to support the "willful, reckless, or wanton disregard exception."226

IV.

LEGISLATION

During its 2009 session, the Georgia General Assembly considered
several bills that affect tort claims in general and product liability
claims in particular. On the product liability front, a notable failure was

219.

Id.

220. Id. at *3.The defendants acknowledged that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim
was not barred by the statute of repose. Id. at *1.
221. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c).
222. 294 Ga. App. 112, 668 S.E.2d 554 (2008).
223. Id. at 112, 668 S.E.2d at 555.
224. Id. at 115-16, 668 S.E.2d at 557.
225. 273 Ga. 454, 455, 543 S.E.2d 21, 23-24 (2001).
226. Parks, 294 Ga. App. at 116, 668 S.E.2d at 558.
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Senate Bill 101,227 which would have provided immunity to certain
manufacturers and sellers of medical drugs and devices from strict
liability claims for design defect and claims for failure to warn as long
as the drug or device at issue had been approved by the FDA.222
Governor Sonny Perdue supported Senate Bill 101 as part of his strategy
for improving economic development by enticing pharmaceutical,
medical-device, and biotechnology companies to locate their facilities in
Georgia, 29 but the controversy surrounding the bill was too much for
its supporters to overcome, and it was defeated in the Senate Economic
Development Committee. 2'
Product manufacturers did, however, win a significant victory during
the 2009 session. Senate Bill 213"21 amended the product liability
statute by adding two subsections that prohibit recovery based on
232
market-share, enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.
These theories are exceptions to the general rule that a plaintiff may
recover only upon proof that the defendant's product caused the injuries,
and they developed in response to the inability of plaintiffs in certain
types of cases to prove specific causation when one of several manufacturers may have made the product to which they were exposed, the
rationale being that public policy favors recovery by an innocent
plaintiff.'
These theories have significant differences, but they share
a burden-shifting framework: once a plaintiff proves exposure to the
product and general causation, the burden shifts to each defendant to
prove that its product did not cause the injuries. 23 Those defendants

227.
228.

Ga. S. Bill 101, Reg. Sess. (2009).
Id. § 1.

229. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Perdue Introduces Tort
Reform Legislation to Improve Business Environment, Protect Landowners (Feb. 6, 2009),
availableat http//gov.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,78006749_132830663_
00.html.

133093179,

230. See Andy Peters, Outlook Bleak for Tort, Evidence Bills, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Mar. 17, 2009, at 1; Andy Peters, Panel Rejects Drug-MakerProtectionBill, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 25, 2009, at 1; Andy Peters, Senators Weigh Drug-Maker Bill,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 23, 2009, at 1.
231. Ga. S. Bill 213, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 625 (codified at O.C.G,.A § 51-1-11(d)-(e)
(Supp. 2009)).
232. Id. § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 625.
233. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 9:1, 9:2 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1987). The seminal case in this area is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980), in which the California Supreme Court reviewed various theories of alternative

liability and adopted the market-share theory. Id. at 928-38; see also Starling v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 186-90 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (analyzing the market-share

and industry-wide theories within the context of Georgia law).
234.

AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 233, §§ 9:29, 9:32.
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that are unable to disprove causation will be proportionately liable for
the plaintiff's injuries based on their respective shares of the market.2
Federal courts applying Georgia law have held that these alternative

theories of liability are not viable in Georgia." 6 Although the Georgia
appellate courts have not spoken on this issue, they have repeatedly held
that the threshold issue in any product liability case, whether based on
strict liability or negligence, is whether the plaintiff was exposed to and
injured by a product manufactured by the defendant. 7 Moreover,
alternative theories of liability offend traditional principles of Georgia
tort law by shifting the burden of proof on causation from the plaintiff
to the defendant. As the court of appeals has observed,
Strict liability is imposed for injuries which are the proximate result
of product defects, not for the manufacture of defective products.
Unless the manufacturer's defective product can be shown to be the
proximate cause of the injuries, there can be no recovery. A manufac-

turer has the absolute right to have his strict liability for injuries
adjudged on the basis of the design of his own marketed product and
not that of someone else." 8
In other words, a manufacturer cannot be liable simply because it made
a defective product; rather, liability attaches only if the defective product

235. Id. §§ 9:30, 9:32, 9:39. In some jurisdictions that have adopted the enterprise
theory, the defendants that are unable to disprove causation may be jointly liable rather
than individually liable for a pro rata proportion of their market shares. Id. § 9:30.
236. Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985)
("Thus, even if this Court were not bound as it is by Georgia law to require proof of
exposure to a particular defendant's products to establish proximate cause, significant
policy reasons favor retention of proximate cause as an essential element of a cause of
action in asbestos litigation."); Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530, 541 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) ("Georgia has not recognized market share liability."); Starling,533 F. Supp. at 186
("[R]ecognition of market share or industrywide liability would result in an unprecedented
departure from traditional Georgia tort law.").
237. See, e.g., John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 751, 604 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2004)
("[T]he injured plaintiff in Georgia must prove that he or she was exposed to [a product]
for which the defendant is responsible."); Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 608,
610-11,548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2001) ("Thus, Hoffman needed to establish that the product
or products that allegedly caused her mesothelioma were, in fact, manufactured or supplied
by the defendants in this case."). This has been the rule in Georgia since long before strict
liability claims were recognized. See Sox v. Carrollton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 Ga. App.
367, 367, 1 S.E.2d 42, 42 (1939) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
against the defendant because there was no proof that the beverage containing the
allegedly unwholesome and poisonous substance was bottled or marketed by the
defendant).
238. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981)
(emphasis added).
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injures someone. Because alternative theories of liability are inconsistent with this principle, it is not surprising that they have not been
adopted in Georgia. But that does not mean Senate Bill 213 was not
necessary. Indeed, the courts that have adopted alternative theories of
liability also recognize the same general rule of causation that Georgia
recognizes, but those courts nevertheless made the policy decision to ease
the burden of proof on causation for certain plaintiffs. The Georgia
appellate courts, as well as the federal courts applying Georgia law, have
rightfully left this public policy decision to the General Assembly.
Senate Bill 213 upholds traditional principles of tort law by ensuring
that manufacturers are not rendered insurers of their products. 9

239. See Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 737, 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1994)
(holding that "a manufacturer is not an insurer that its product is, from a design viewpoint,
incapable of producing injury"); Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 645, 299
S.E.2d 897, 899 (1983) (holding that "a manufacturer is not an insurer against all risks of
injury associated with its product").

